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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANN B. HOPKINS
Plaintiff,
v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE
Defendant.

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 84-3040
(Gesell, J.)

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF ON RELIEF ISSUES

I.
Defendant's Brief Mostly Reargues
Settled Questions Without Presenting Any New
Reasons Why This Court Should Decide Them Differently Now

This reply need not and does not devote much space in answer
to Parts I and II of "Defendant's Post-Trial Brief on Remedial
Issues."

Part I simply restates defendant's position on

liability.
Part II seems to ask this Court to reaffirm its 1985
position on constructive discharge with no new facts to support
that action and no basis for thinking that the Court of Appeals
would alter its 1987 contrary view.

A great deal of energy is

spent by defendant _wtrying to demonstrate that the Court of
Appeals' decision on constructive discharge is not technically
"the law of this case," a point plaintiff addressed in her prior

brief.
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Defendant does not explain how its argument on law of

the case, even if accepted, would change the virtual certainty
that the Court of Appeals would refuse to reconsider, much less
modify, its decision that plaintiff was constructively
discharged.

In effect, defendant asks this Court to embark on a

quixotic quest.
Nor do we understand what is intended by Subpart II.E of
defendant's brief.

There defendant seems to suggest that this

Court was wrong in holding that plaintiff's departure from Price
Waterhouse would bar her from all relief for the period after her
resignation, and that her resignation would merely affect the
question of mitigation.

If that is so, then the debate on

_y Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals' mandate is
the same as its opinion, so that by vacating its original mandate
. the court also vacated its opinion. As a legal matter, however,
~ a~pe-at.e- court's opinion is distinct from its mandate, -w-:ttf1
th~ ~-tt=E--,ifeing the specific direction th~t is given to a lower
E.g., city
cou t:---:rne D.C. Circuit has noted the distinction.
of Cleveland v. Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d 344, 346-47
n.25 ("[i]t has long been recognized that the court's opinion may
be consulted to ascertain the intent of the mandate"). Typically
the mandate is embodied ~ i n the opinion, and for that reason
the rules provide that the appellate court's opinion ordinarily
constitutes the mandate. The two are distinct, though, as the
present case shows.
Here the D.C. Circuit's original mandate "affirm[ed] the
District Court's liability determination and reverse[d] and
remand[ed] the case for determination of appropriate damages and
relief." Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). In light of the Supreme Court's subsequent reversal
on liability, the D.C. Circuit's mandate was no longer
appropriate, and the court vacated it. But the opinion on
unappealed issues relating to relief was still viable, and it was
not vacated.
Defendant argues that this Court's ruling that the failure
to repropose plaintiff was nondiscriminatory is also the law of
the case. This may be so but does not aid defendant, since the
Court of Appeals did not differ with that ruling brt/still found
constructive discharge.
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constructive discharge is an arid one, and the more fruitful
discussion concerns the amount and character of relief plaintiff
ought to receive if she should prevail on liability.

These, we

believe, are the only open issues left in any event, and we confine
the balance of this reply to those issues.

II.

There Is No Bar To The Relief
Sought By Plaintiff

Defendant has not made any persuasive new arguments against
granting plaintiff admission to partnership as the proper future
relief.

It again argues that Title VII does not provide for such

relief but fails to explain how the decision in Hishon v.
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1989), can otherwise be given meaning
since defendant also opposes "front earnings."

Indeed, to the

extent that defendant argues the imponderables and undesirability
of front earnings, it indirectly reinforces the simplicity and
viability of a partnership award.

One kind of relief or the

other is surely required by the principle that Title VII is
intended to provide make-whole relief.
Defendant returns to the argument that plaintiff should have
no relief beyond June 30, 1984 because she was not reproposed for
admission to partnership.

Defendant also argues that plaintiff's

relief should be cut off then because she failed to mitigate
damages.
The first of these arguments ignores the fact that both this
Court and the Court of Appeals have already rejected its premise
and have adopted the opposite proposition -- that if plaintiff was
wrongly denied partnership in 1983, she is entitled to relief which
-3-

assumes that she would otherwise have become a partner in that year
and would have continued to be a partner from that time forward.
Thus, this Court held in 1985 that, but for the unapproved
attempt to bifurcate this case, the compensation plaintiff would
have received as a partner between July 1, 1983 and January 17,
1984 would have been an appropriate subtrahend in calculating her
monetary relief for that period:

Because plaintiff has failed to prove a constructive
discharge, she is not entitled to monetary relief for
the period subsequent to her resignation. Clark v.
Marsh, 665 F.2d at 1172. Nevertheless, plaintiff has
satisfied her bw:den of proving discrimination under
Title VII and _established the predicate for an award
of backpay from the date she would have been elected
partner, July 1, 1983, until voluntary resignation on
January 17, 1984. Backpay for these feM months,
limited to the difference between plaintiff's
compensation as a senior rranager during that period
and what her cornpensation would have been if elected
to partnership, might have been appropriate if proof
had been presented. However, no evidence has been
presented on what compensation plaintiff would have
received if she had been elected partner.
~
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1121 (D.C. 1109,
1121; emphasis added.

~-

~

-

The Court of Appeals accept.ed this formulation of the
backpay calculation as correct, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825
F.2d at 465; and, because it found that there was a constructive
discharge, it ordered a remand to this Court for an award of
backpay on this basis covering the post-resignation period as
well.

Id. at 473.

The Supreme Court's decision on liability did

not disturb these rulings on relief.

\
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The necessary premise of these rulings is that plaintiff
should have been made a partner in July 1983, so that the failure
to repropose her later that year is immaterial.

Defendant's

attempt to reargue this point is not based on any intervening
events or new evidence which would justify such a departure from
the law of the case.
Defendant also suggests that factually plaintiff has not
kept up her skills in management consulting sufficiently to
warrant making her a partner in Price Waterhouse.

It bases this

argument entirely on Mr. Connor's almost-offhand view as the
courtroom representative of Price Waterhouse that, "I think she
probably is rusty now in the systems area.
you know.

Just hearing it yesterday."

That's my judgment,

Tr. 248.

Y

Defendant made no attempt to test plaintiff's "rustiness."
It did not try to qualify Mr. Connor (a C.P.A. by training) as an
expert.

It did not call any of its Management Advisory Services

partners to testify on this point.
as a weak afterthought.

This argument clearly comes

Indeed, defense counsel quickly moved

beyond it by asking Mr. Connor to assume "that she has kept up or
she could bring herself up to speed quickly otherwise."
248.

Tr.

This Court has been given no factual basis for a contrary

assumption.

y Again, transcript references are to the 1990 relief trial
record unless otherwise noted.
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III.
Defendant Has Failed to
Assume, Much Less Discharge, Its
Burden to Prove Failure to Mitigate
Defendant offered proof that over 30 people have left Price
Waterhouse and have became partners in other "Big 6" (formerly
"Big 8") firms.

Only four of these, however, had been rejected

after being proposed for partnership at Price Waterhouse.
219. ]_/

Tr.

Defendant's witness on this point acknowledged that

several career patterns are "typical" for senior managers leaving
Price Waterhouse and that one of these is setting up one's own
business -- as both plaintiff and her former husband had done.
Tr. 217-218.

Defendant belabors the point that plaintiff could

have gotten herself on a partnership track in another firm, but
the Court viewed partnership election as unpredictable.

"[T]he

partnership thing is just one of those things that eventually hit
with some place, one person one time, and another person another
time."

Tr. 224.

As noted below (n.3), the odds were very much

against plaintiff's becoming a partner elsewhere after having
been rejected at Price Waterhouse.

Moreover, the firm offered

most of these people who left it professional placement
assistance, which it did not offer plaintiff.

Tr. 14, 273, 301,

311.

]_J
Defendant is wrong in asserting that over 30 of its
former employees had become partners elsewhere after being
rejected for partnership at Price Waterhouse (see defendant's
brief at 29 and n.13).
In fact, only four rejected candidates
became partners in other firms (see DX A-7), while at least 100
had been rejected during the relevant time period. See Tr. 261263, 355.
-6-
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The evidence also showed that in the mid-1980's senior
employee salaries were not as good at several of the other Big 6
firms as at Price Waterhouse.
Tr. 195 (Gray - Coopers

&

Tr. 185 (Beach-Deloitte

&

Touche);

Lybrand); Tr. 200-201 (Grimm - Ernst

Young); Tr. 205 (Wren - Arthur Andersen

&

Co).

&

Indeed, those

salaries were not materially better at three of the four other
firms about which there was evidence than plaintiff's average
self-employment earnings between 1984 and 1987, when she decided
to seek a job at the World Bank.

See PX A-15; Tr. 56, 60.

Defendant's suggestion that plaintiff could have become a
partner in another firm is also refuted by its own placement
expert, Mr. Redford.

He even implied that individuals who had

filed suits such as this one should go to the length of lying in
order to conceal that from prospective employers and should
continue to lie if they did get hired.
"stretch their imaginations."

His euphemism was

Tr. 314-15.

That kind of advice

is impractical as well as deplorable.
Apart from suggesting that plaintiff might have become a
partner in another Big 6 firm after several years as a senior
employee,.!/ defendant has not offered any proof that plaintiff
had career options that would have resulted in better
compensation than her current position at the World Bank.
12.

Tr.

It was defendant's burden to do so, of course; it was not

Nor is it clear
_!/ This of course is merely a possibility.
that beginning partners at all of these firms earn more than
plaintiff's current $92,500 compensation at the World Bank. See
Tr. 186, 195. Arthur Andersen, which does pay more, gives its
partners almost no retirement benefits. Tr. 268.
-7-
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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
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Washington, D.C. 20036

~-~

Douglas B. Huron

